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Abstract
A recent flurry of research activity has attempted to quantitatively define “fairness” for decisions based on
statistical and machine learning (ML) predictions. The rapid growth of this new field has led to wildly inconsistent
terminology and notation, presenting a serious challenge for cataloguing and comparing definitions. This paper
attempts to bring much-needed order.
First, we explicate the various choices and assumptions made—often implicitly—to justify the use of prediction-
based decisions. Next, we show how such choices and assumptions can raise concerns about fairness and we present
a notationally consistent catalogue of fairness definitions from the ML literature. In doing so, we offer a concise
reference for thinking through the choices, assumptions, and fairness considerations of prediction-based decision
systems.
1 Introduction
Prediction-based decision-making has swept through industry and is quickly making its way into government. These
techniques are already common in lending [70, 111, 55], hiring [119, 120, 77], and online advertising [163], and
increasingly figure into decisions regarding pretrial detention [6, 106, 48, 39], immigration detention [103], child
maltreatment screening [167, 46, 22], public health [132, 144], and welfare eligibility [46]. Across these domains,
decisions are based on predictions of an outcome deemed relevant to the decision.
We outline the choices and assumptions commonly made (often implicitly) to justify such a decision system.1
These choices and assumptions affect how a system behaves, with potentially serious implications for disadvantaged
groups along social axes such as race, gender, and class. This has motivated the field of research we will call Fairness
in Machine Learning (ML).
Fairness in ML has been explored in popular books [135, 46] and a White House report [47], surveyed in technical
review papers [13, 52, 56, 24, 171], tutorials [9, 126, 124, 29], and an in-progress textbook [10], and inspired a number
of software packages [178, 49, 2, 57, 64].
Though the ML fairness conversation is somewhat new, it resembles older work. For example, since the 1960s,
psychometricians have studied the fairness of educational tests based on their ability to predict performance (at school
or work) [25, 26, 165, 36, 45, 141, 80, 107, 81]. More recently, Dorans and Cook review broader notions of fairness,
including in test design and administration [41].
Our hope with this paper is to contribute a concise, cautious, and reasonably comprehensive catalogue of choices,
assumptions, and fairness considerations. While we regard no notion as the axiomatic definition of fairness (nor the
guarantor of any particular social goal), our catalogue enables practitioners to systematically consider these concepts.
The paper proceeds as follows: in Section 2, we introduce our main setup and notation. Section 3 outlines common
choices and assumptions made to justify prediction-based decision systems. Concern about these can motivate various
flavors of fairness constraints, which we present in Section 4. Section 5 describes fairness in alternative setups
(reinforcement learning and bandits). In Section 6 we separate the flavors of fairness from the groups to which they
can be applied. Section 7 presents tensions among fairness definitions. We highlight some ways forward in Section 8.
Section 9 concludes.
1We focus on prediction-based decisions, but much of our discussion applies also to decisions made entirely by humans, or by a
combination of statistical predictions and human discretion [66]. We leave explicit comparisons among these to future work.
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2 Setup and notation
Consider a population about whom we want to make decisions. We index people by i = 1, ..., n.2 Each person has
variables (i.e. features, covariates, or inputs) vi ∈ V that are known at decision time. In some cases, we can separate
these into sensitive variable(s) ai (e.g. race, gender, or class) and other variables xi, writing vi = (ai, xi). A binary
decision di is made for each person. We use bold font to denote a vector of values for everyone in the population,
d = (d1, ..., dn). We restrict decisions to be functions of variables known at decision time, δ : V → {0, 1}, where
di = δ(vi).
In prediction-based decisions, each person has a binary outcome (i.e. label or target) yi that is unknown at decision
time. We define random variables V , Y , D = δ(V ) as the values of a person randomly drawn from the population.
Prediction-based decisions are made by first estimating the conditional probability
P [Y = 1|V = vi].
The decision system does not know the true conditional probability; instead it uses ψ : V → [0, 1] where si = ψ(vi)
is a score intended3 to estimate P [Y = 1|V = vi]. Let S = ψ(V ) be a random score from the population. A
prediction-based decision system has a decision function δ that is a function of the score alone, i.e. δ(v) = f(ψ(v))
for some function f . We leave to future work the discussion of decision systems that include discretion beyond the
score’s statistical prediction [66].
Both ψ and δ are functions of a sample of {(vi, yi)} that we hope resembles the population.
3 Choices and assumptions made to justify prediction-based decision systems
Several recent papers have raised concerns about how social goals are abstracted and formulated to fit into a prediction
problem [35, 155, 65, 67, 131, 40, 152, 74, 44, 137]. It may be difficult for a practitioner to see where these important
points connect to their work. To bridge the gap, we link these socio-technical concerns to quantitative choices and
assumptions. Some of these concerns are also explored by d’Alessandro et al. [34] in their guide to practitioners and
by Suresh and Guttag [161] in their framework for understanding “bias” in ML.
Below are some common choices and assumptions made (often implicitly) to justify a prediction-based decision
system. These assumptions take the problem of deriving a desirable policy based on the results of past decisions and
reduce it to the simpler problem of accurately predicting a single outcome. This conversion is analytically convenient,
but introduces limitations on how the systems operate and how they are evaluated.
We are motivated by a few examples prevalent in the literature: pretrial detention, child maltreatment screening,
and lending. We question some of the most salient choices and assumptions for both scientific and political merit.4
See section 8.2 for a sketch of how to address some of these issues.
3.1 Choose a goal
Choose a goal that the decisions are meant to achieve. For a benevolent social planner, this may be justice or some
notion of social welfare [78]. For a bank, this may be profits. Often there are genuinely different and conflicting
goals, which are not resolved by more data [46, 136]. Furthermore, make the (substantial) assumption that progress
towards this goal can be summarized by a number (denote this by G).
3.2 Choose a population
Choose to make decisions at the individual level (as opposed to a policy that acts at the community level) about
members of a particular population. In pretrial decisions, the population is defendants. In lending decisions, the
population is loan applicants. These populations are sampled from the world by some mechanism, e.g. people become
defendants by being arrested, applicants by applying for loans. The mechanism of entry into this population may
reflect unjust social structures, e.g. racist policing that targets black people for arrest [1, 114] and discrimination in
loan preapplication screening [31].
2We assume this finite population (of size n) is large enough to approximate the “superpopulation” [61] distribution from which
they were drawn, and refer to both as the “population”.
3We assume scores have been calibrated to be interpreted as probabilities, though this is non-trivial in practice [129]. More generally,
decisions can be based on scores from methods such as SVM and random forest that do not estimate conditional probabilities [71].
4These choices might not be made in any specific, sequential order. Each can influence the others, e.g. Green et al. [65, 67] note that
3.4 can influence 3.1 insofar as measuring crime puts emphasis on crime prevention as opposed to other indicators of social well-being.
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3.3 Choose a decision space
Assume decisions are made at the individual level and are binary. In this simplified setup, pretrial decisions are
usually restricted to detain or not, while lending decisions to lend or not. Both these decision spaces leave out many
less harmful and more supportive interventions. Expanded pretrial services [102, 170, 128, 115] might include offering
funds to help defendants with transportation to court, paying for childcare, text message reminders of court dates
[158, 28, 166, 130], drug counseling, or locating job opportunities. In lending, a broader decision space could include
providing longer-term, lower-interest loans.
3.4 Choose an outcome
Assume the utility of decisions depends in part on a binary outcome that can be measured at the individual level.
Suppose decisions about a family intervention program are based on maltreatment of children. Let yi = 1 if there
is maltreatment, and 0 otherwise. Consider the following scenario: suppose in Family #1 there is maltreatment,
with or without this intervention program. Suppose in Family #2 there is maltreatment without the intervention,
but the intervention helps. Then it is rational enroll Family #2 in this program, but Family #1 may need an
alternative program. This example considers the potential outcomes under both decisions [151, 82, 73]: yi(0) without
the intervention, yi(1) under the intervention. The benefit or harm from a decision can depend on both potential
outcomes.
More generally, let yi(d) be the potential outcome under the whole decision system (the bold d denotes that the
decision for person j may affect the outcome for person i, where j 6= i). Assume now that the utility of decisions can
be expressed as a function of these and no other outcomes. In mathematical notation, the utility under decisions d
is a function of the potential outcomes for all people under all possible decision policies: G(d) = γ(d,y(0), ...,y(1)).
The bold font denotes vectors of outcomes and decisions for the whole population. In the pretrial detention example:
y(0) are the outcomes for everyone if everyone is released pretrial, y(1) are the outcomes for everyone if everyone is
detained pretrial, with all other possible decision regimes in between.
Prediction-based decision systems often only consider one or two outcomes, e.g. in pretrial decisions, outcomes
of interest are crime (measured as arrest, more on this later) and non-appearance in court. In contrast, human
decision-makers may consider several outcomes, including impacts on a defendant’s well-being or caretaker status
[18]. Narrowing focus to a chosen, measured outcome can fall short of larger goals (this is sometimes called omitted
payoff bias [98]). For example, in making decisions about college admissions, it may be tempting to narrow the larger
goals of higher education to simply the future GPAs of admitted students [99].
Defining an outcome as binary rather than multinomial or continuous can lose information [63]. Moreover, the
choice of how to define the binary outcome affects the disparity in outcomes between groups (and hence the disparity
in decisions between groups). For example, combining petty misdemeanors with violent felonies can affect disparities
[34].
3.5 Assume decisions can be evaluated separately, symmetrically, and simultaneously
Assume decisions can be evaluated as the sum of separately evaluated individual decisions. This eliminates consider-
ation of aggregate decisions (e.g. the number of detainees, the number of loans, etc.) within groups. This assumption
resembles beliefs from utilitarianism, which represents social welfare as a sum of individual utilities, allowing for the
uneven distribution of benefits to different individuals (and different groups) as long as overall utility is maximized
[148, 153]. The “separately” assumption includes assuming that outcomes are not affected by the decisions for others,
an assumption known as no interference [82]: yi(d) = yi(di).
Assuming decisions can be evaluated symmetrically (i.e. identically) requires, for example, that the harm of
denying a loan to someone who could repay is equal across people. In reality, this error could be especially harmful
to lower-income applicants.
Finally, assuming decisions can be made simultaneously (“batch classification” [24]), as opposed to serially, elimi-
nates consideration of dynamics that could be important. For example, Harcourt shows that if the population changes
their behavior in response to changing decision probabilities, prediction-based decisions can backfire and diminish
social welfare [69]. While it may be possible to make predictions robust to strategic behavior, this may also have
social costs, especially for disadvantaged groups [79, 121]. Alternatively, dynamics can be considered in a way that
is socially beneficial [77, 101].
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Mathematically, we write the separate, symmetric, and simultaneous (sss) utility as:
Gsss(d) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
γsss(di, yi(0), yi(1))
= E[γsss(D,Y (0), Y (1))]
3.6 Assume away one potential outcome
Prediction-based decision systems usually only focus on one potential outcome (e.g. crime if released) and assume
the other is known (e.g. no crime if detained). But studies have found criminogenic effects of imprisonment [172, 38,
33, 123]. Even if pretrial tools only predict events during the possible detention period (as some recommend [53]), it
should not be assumed that detention prevents crime during that period. A person may be driven to break the law
while in jail.
In child maltreatment screening, prediction is aimed at maltreatment in the absence of intervention, implicitly
assuming intervention is helpful. Interventions may not be helpful, though, and impacts of interventions may vary
by group. There is evidence of racial disparity in foster care placement [145] and access to mental health services [58]
among youth reported to the child welfare system.
3.7 Choose the prediction setup
For notational simplicity, we denote the potential outcome of interest as y (often omitting subscripts to index a
person i). Then γsss(d, y) takes 4 possible values. Without loss of generality, it is positive (good) when d = y and
negative (bad) when d 6= y. Adopting confusion matrix terminology, express utility in terms of true positives (TP),
false positives (FP), false negatives (FN), and true negatives (TN):
Gsss(d) = E[gTPY D +gFP(1− Y )D
+gFNY (1−D) +gTN(1− Y )(1−D)]
where gTP , gFP , gFN , gTN are scalars.
Assuming Y is fixed, choose D to maximize this. Rearranging terms, dropping those without D, and renormalizing
(dividing by a positive number), the quantity to maximize can be written as:
Gsss,∗(d; c) = E
[
Y D − gTN − gFP
gTP + gTN − gFP − gFN︸ ︷︷ ︸
=c
D
]
with only one parameter, c ∈ [0, 1]. Corbett-Davies et al. call this immediate utility [30]. Lipton et al. [108] note
that adding Y (c− 1) and negating gives the cost-sensitive risk that Menon and Williamson aim to minimize [117]:
Rsss(d; c) = E[(1− c)Y (1−D) + c(1− Y )D].
Giving false positives and false negatives equal cost, Rsss(d; 0.5) = 0.5P [Y 6= D]. Thus, minimizing Rsss(d; 0.5),
maximizing Gsss,∗(d; 0.5), and maximizing accuracy (P [Y = D]) are all equivalent.
Gsss,∗ is maximized with perfect prediction, that is D = Y . But only variables V are known at decision time.
So decisions are restricted to be functions of these variables, δ : V → {0, 1}, where d = δ(v). It has been shown
[94, 12, 30] that Gsss,∗(δ; c) = E[Y δ(V )− cδ(V )] is maximized at
δ(v) = I(P [Y = 1|V = v] ≥ c))
so decisions are made by thresholding (at c) the conditional probabilities of the outcome, given covariates [30]. This
can be called a single-threshold rule [29].
In implementing such a rule, the decision maker chooses variables V and computes a score ψ(v) that is intended
to estimate P [Y = 1|V = v]. Below we first discuss variable selection. We then describe four reasons the estimate
ψ(v) differs from the estimand P [Y = 1|V = v]: non-representative data, measurement error, an incorrect model,
and statistical uncertainty.
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3.7.1 Variable selection
The variables V are chosen by a process commonly called variable or feature selection. This includes both the choice of
what data to collect and use, and which variables to include in the model. Conditional probabilities P [Y = 1|V = v]
change depending on what we condition on.5 Person #1 can have a higher conditional probability than Person #2
with a choice of variables V , but a lower conditional probability with a choice of variables V ′. This can be obscured
by describing these probabilities as the “true risk” (of crime or loan default), which we explore further in Section 8.1.
3.7.2 Sampling
A sample of {(vi, yi)} may not be representative of the population for several reasons. For example, in pretrial
decisions, the sample may be drawn from the population conditional on release, excluding people who were detained
(a problem sometimes called selective labels) [98, 105, 22, 29, 37]. Defendants released in the past may not be
representative of current defendants. Incorrectly assuming the sample is representative can lead to biased estimation of
conditional probabilities (e.g. probability of crime given input variables), biased estimation of utility, and inadequate
fairness adjustments [90].
Under a missing at random assumption (Y ⊥ D|V ), modeling could hope to avoid this selection bias [61]. But
there can be regions of the input variables v where no defendants are released (no d = 0) and hence y is unobserved
[24]. One option is extrapolation: fit the model to released defendants (d = 0), then use the model for all defendants
(regardless of d) even if this includes new regions of the variables. However, ML models can perform poorly with
such a shift in input variables [146]. Another option is to trust previous decisions: assume that regions of the input
variables where no defendants were released (no d = 0) are regions where all defendants would have committed crimes
if released (y = 1) [37].
3.7.3 Measurement
Similarly compromising are issues of measurement. In the pretrial detention setting, the outcome Y is often defined
as crime, but measured as arrest. In doing so, we would need to take seriously not only the difference between arrests
and crime, but the fact that this difference may be greater for some groups (known as differential measurement error
[168]). For example, black people are arrested more often for crimes they did not commit [1, 113].6 Measurement
error in Y is sometimes called noisy labels [127], mislabeled data [17, 16], or unreliable oracles [154].
What about measurement error of the observed variables V ? If V is mismeasured, our ability to predict Y could be
diminished. However, mismeasurement of V is somewhat less serious than mismeasurement of Y because prediction
models are designed to use V only to the extent that it predicts Y .
If V is mismeasured differentially across groups, this could lead to different prediction error rates across those
groups. For example, accessing drug treatment (V ) is used to predict child maltreatment (Y ). If V is measured
as accessing public treatment, its measurement will differ between poorer families and wealthier families, who may
instead access private (i.e. unobserved) treatment [46].
A model that is aware of group membership may be able to account for this, but if the relationship between V
and Y is weaker for a particular group, prediction error rates for that group will be higher.
3.7.4 Model selection
We have a choice of how to model P [Y = 1|V = v] as a function of v, that is, model selection.7 Estimation of
P [Y = 1|V = v] can be highly model-dependent, particularly if V is high-dimensional. Though existing tools may
simplify to only consider low-dimensional representations (e.g. number of past arrests), the observable variables may
be richer (e.g. times and locations of past arrests). Therefore model choice cannot be easily dismissed, even in
situations of apparently low dimension. In particular, models can differ in prediction measure disparities between
groups [23].
5“Conditioning is the soul of statistics” [14].
6The pretrial risk assessment literature inadequately addresses error in using arrests as a measure of crime. A full analysis is beyond
the scope of this paper, but we note that the evidence cited is far from conclusive. Skeem and Lowencamp write “official records of
arrest — particularly for violent offenses — are a valid criterion” [157]. But they cite Piquero, who writes “self-reported offending data
reveal a much more similar set of estimates regarding offending across race” [142]. They also cite Piquero and Brame, who found little
racial differences in either self-report or arrest record data in a sample of “serious adolescent offenders” in Philadelphia and Phoenix
[143]. These findings say little about cases with racial differences in arrests.
7Methods that do not first estimate conditional probabilities (e.g. SVM, random forest) also involve several researcher degrees of
freedom.
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3.7.5 Statistical uncertainty
In addition to bias, there is uncertainty (variance) in estimating P [Y = 1|V = v]. If the model has group-specific
parameters, uncertainty may be larger for groups with less data.
4 Flavors of fairness definitions
Under the choices and assumptions of section 3 we saw that a single-threshold rule is considered optimal [30, 29, 99,
108]. If any of the choices and assumptions are not justified, then optimality is not guaranteed.
An even stronger claim about the single-threshold rule is that it “maximizes a natural notion of social welfare for
all groups” [29]. Here we explore this notion of fairness (with the explicit assumption that scores are well-estimated):
• Single-threshold fairness:
δ(v) = I(ψ(v) ≥ c)) where
ψ(v) ≈ P [Y = 1|V = v]
To see how this plays out at the group level, assume for simplicity two groups: a (advantaged) and a′ (disadvan-
taged). We can write the overall utility of decisions as a weighted average from the decisions in each group:
Gsss(δ) =E[γsss(Y, δ(V ))]
=P [A = a] · E [γsss(Y, δ(V ))|A = a]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Gsssa (δ)
+
P [A = a′] · E [γsss(Y, δ(V ))|A = a′]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Gsss
a′ (δ)
Under the assumptions, a single-threshold rule maximizes both Gsssa and G
sss
a′ . It may be tempting to conclude that
this is fair to both groups. However, the impacts of decisions may not be contained within groups. Furthermore, the
disadvantaged group may have a lower maximum.
For example, in lending, a possible goal for applicants is continued access to credit over time and across multiple
applications. Liu et al. consider a lending policy designed to increase applicants credit scores over successive appli-
cations, rather than a bank’s profit [111]. Their optimal policy maximizes credit scores in both groups, but these
maximums are not equal. Starting out with an advantage, the wealthier group enjoys larger increases in credit scores.
It may also be tempting to conclude that a single-threshold rule is fair on the basis that people with the same
scores are treated the same, regardless of group membership. But as we saw above, conditional probabilities change
with variable selection. Thus, this notion of fairness relies on scores being based on enough predictive variables to be
meaningful. In the limit, the scores would be perfect predictions, i.e. the outcomes themselves.
This motivates fairness definitions enforcing equal decisions across groups, conditioned on the outcome. We
explore these in 4.1, as well as three other flavors of definitions in 4.2-4.4 that compare decisions without explicit
consideration of an outcome to predict.
4.1 Equal prediction measures
Under the choices and assumptions of section 3, Gsss expresses utility. If the impacts of decisions are contained within
groups, then Gsssa and G
sss
a′ can be considered group-specific utilities. A notion of fairness might ask these to be equal.
When false positives and false negatives have equal cost, this corresponds to:
• Equal accuracy: P [D = Y |A = a] = P [D = Y |A = a′]
For example, we might want a medical diagnostic tool to be equally accurate across groups. Instead of comparing
overall accuracies, we could restrict the comparison to subgroups. For example, to reflect the perspective of “innocent”
defendants, we could compare accuracies only for defendants who would not get rearrested (Y = 0) [126]. Or we could
compare how accurately we predict repayment among those granted loans (D = 1). The confusion matrix illustrates
match and mismatch between Y and D, with margins expressing conditioning on subgroups based on Y or D; see
Table 1.
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Y=1 Y=0
P [Y=1]
Base rate
P [Y=0]
D=1
True Positive
(TP)
False Positive
(FP)
P [Y=1|D=1]
Positive
Predictive
Value (PPV),
Precision
P [Y=0|D=1]
False
Discovery
Rate (FDR)
D=0
False
Negative
(FN)
True Negative
(TN)
P [Y=1|D=0]
False
Omission
Rate (FOR)
P [Y=0|D=0]
Negative
Predictive
Value (NPV)
P [D=1]
P [D=1|Y=1]
True Positive
Rate (TPR),
Recall,
Sensitivity
P [D=1|Y=0]
False Positive
Rate (FPR)
P [D=Y ]
Accuracy
P [D=0]
P [D=0|Y=1]
False
Negative Rate
(FNR)
P [D=0|Y=0]
True Negative
Rate (TNR),
Specificity
Table 1: Confusion matrix, illustrating match and mismatch between outcome Y and decision D.
4.1.1 Definitions from the confusion matrix
For any box in the confusion matrix involving the decision D, we can require equality across groups. We list definitions
from the margins of the confusion matrix, grouped by equivalence from pairs that sum to 1 and their expression as
conditional independence. While this induces some repetition, we hope that being explicit can address some of the
confusion in the literature:
• Equal FPRs: P [D = 1|Y = 0, A = a] = P [D = 1|Y = 0, A = a′]
Equal TNRs: P [D = 0|Y = 0, A = a] = P [D = 0|Y = 0, A = a′]
D ⊥ A | Y = 0
• Equal TPRs: P [D = 1|Y = 1, A = a] = P [D = 1|Y = 1, A = a′]
Equal FNRs: P [D = 0|Y = 1, A = a] = P [D = 0|Y = 1, A = a′]
D ⊥ A | Y = 1
(also known as equal opportunity [70])
• Equal FORs: P [Y = 1|D = 0, A = a] = P [Y = 1|D = 0, A = a′]
Equal NPVs: P [Y = 0|D = 0, A = a] = P [Y = 0|D = 0, A = a′]
Y ⊥ A | D = 0
• Equal PPVs: P [Y = 1|D = 1, A = a] = P [Y = 1|D = 1, A = a′]
Equal FDRs: P [Y = 0|D = 1, A = a] = P [Y = 0|D = 1, A = a′]
Y ⊥ A | D = 1
(also called predictive parity [21], assessed by an outcome test [156])
Chouldechova calls the first two bullet points error rate balance [21] (also called separation [10] or equalized odds
[70], see Section 4.1.3). These reflect a fairness notion that people with the same outcome are treated the same,
regardless of group.
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The second two bullet points are called sufficiency [10], see Section 4.1.3. They reflect a fairness notion that
people with the same decision would have had similar outcomes, regardless of group.
Zafar et al. call all four bullets (as well as equal accuracy) avoiding disparate mistreatment [176].
Berk et al. also consider a definition based on the ratio of false negatives to false positives:
• Treatment equality [13]:
P [Y = 1, D = 0|A = a]
P [Y = 0, D = 1|A = a] =
P [Y = 1, D = 0|A = a′]
P [Y = 0, D = 1|A = a′]
4.1.2 Scores
Prediction-based decision systems compute a score s(v) that is intended to estimate P [Y = 1|V = v], where S = s(V )
is a random score from the population. We can consider definitions based on scores:
• Balance for the negative class:
E(S|Y = 0, A = a) = E(S|Y = 0, A = a′)
• Balance for the positive class:
E(S|Y = 1, A = a) = E(S|Y = 1, A = a′)
• Calibration within groups: P [Y = 1|S,A = a] = S for all a
• AUC parity: the area under the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve is the same across groups.
Barocas et al. point out that calibration within groups is satisfied without a fairness-specific effort [10]. With
enough (representative, well-measured) data and model flexibility, a score S can be very close to E(Y |A,X). So by a
lemma,8 we have E(Y |S,A) = S, i.e. calibration within groups. With many X variables, A may be well-predicted by
them, i.e. there is a function a(X) that is approximately A. Then we can get calibration within groups even without
using A because E(Y |A,X) = E(Y |X).
Corbett-Davies et al. point out that calibration within groups does not prevent problematic practices [30]. The
above-mentioned lemma holds using any X variables (or none at all). As we have noted, inclusion or exclusion of X
variables changes scores, and therefore the fraction of each group that ends up above a threshold. Intentional manip-
ulations of this could mimic the racist practice of redlining, justifying loan denials by neighborhood characteristics
[116].
4.1.3 Separation and sufficiency
The two margins of the confusion matrix are distinguished by Barocas et al. as [10]:
• Separation: D ⊥ A | Y or S ⊥ A | Y
(also known as error rate balance [21], equalized odds [70], conditional procedure accuracy equality [13], or disparate
mistreatment [])
• Sufficiency: Y ⊥ A | D or Y ⊥ A | S
(With D, this is also known as conditional use accuracy equality [13]. Somewhat confusingly, with S, this is also
sometimes called calibration [21, 29] or matching conditional frequencies [70].)
In terms of D, these are equivalent to pairs of definitions from the margins of the confusion matrix. In terms of S,
calibration within groups implies sufficiency. Conversely, if S satisfies sufficiency then there exists a function l such
that l(S) satisfies calibration within groups (see Proposition 1 in [10]).
4.2 Equal decisions across groups (stratified)
We now turn to fairness notions that focus on decisions D, without the outcome Y . These can be motivated in a few
ways.
Suppose that from the perspective of the population about whom we make decisions, one decision is always preferable
to another, regardless of Y (e.g. non-detention, admission into college9) [126]. In other words, allocation of benefits
and harms across groups can be examined by looking at the decision (D) alone.
8Lemma. For any random variables X, Y , and A:
E(Y |E(Y |A,X), A) = E(Y |A,X).
Proof. Let g(A,X) = E(Y |A,X). By the law of total expectation:
E(Y |g(A,X), A) = E[E(Y |g(A,X), A,X)|g(A,X), A] = g(A,X).
9In contrast, lending to someone unable to repay could hurt their credit score [111]. Of course, the ability to repay may strongly
depend on the terms of the loan.
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Furthermore, while the decisions (e.g. detentions) are observed, the outcome being predicted (e.g. crime if
released) may be unobserved, making error rates unknown. Therefore, disparity in decisions (e.g. racial disparity in
detention rates) may be more publicly visible than disparity in error rates (e.g. racial disparity in detention rates
among those who would not have committed a crime).
Yet another motivation to consider fairness constraints without the outcome Y is measurement error (see Section
3.7.3). For example, if arrests are a poor measure of crime, fairness constraints based on arrests may be unappealing
[87]. One might believe that all group differences in Y are a result of measurement error, and that the true outcomes
on which we want to base decisions are actually similar across groups [51].
Even more broadly, we might consider the relationship between A and Y to be unfair. (As we say at the conclusion
of Section 4.4, this motivates designing interventions to reduce disparities in Y .)
These considerations can all motivate requiring demographic parity: equal decision rates across groups (e.g. equal
lending rates across races), regardless of outcome Y . A related definition considers parity within strata:
• Demographic parity: D ⊥ A
(also known as statistical parity, or group fairness [43])
• Conditional demographic parity: D ⊥ A | Data
When Data = Y , conditional demographic parity is separation. When Data = X (the insensitive variables), it is
equivalent to:
• Unawareness: δ(a, xi) = δ(a′, xi) for all i
(also known as blindness, fairness through unawareness [104], anti-classification [29], treatment parity [108])
Unawareness implies that people with the same x are treated the same, i.e. δ(vi) = δ(vi′) if xi = xi′ . Note the
opposite is not true, since it is possible that no two people have the same x. A related idea requires people who are
similar in x to be treated similarly. More generally, we could define a similarity metric between people that is aware
of the sensitive variables, motivating the next flavor of fairness definitions [43].
4.3 Metric fairness
Assume there is a metric that defines similarity based on all variables, m : V × V → R.
• Metric fairness: for every v, v′ ∈ V, their closeness implies closeness in decisions |δ(v)− δ(v′)| ≤ m(v, v′)
(also known as individual fairness, the m-Lipschitz property [43], and perfect metric fairness [149])
Consider metric fairness where the metric only considers insensitive variables, m(x, x′). Then metric fairness
implies unawareness.
4.3.1 The metric
Definitions of the metric differ. In the original work, Dwork et al. consider a similarity metric over individuals [43].
But in subsequent research, the metric is often defined over the variables input to the classifier [149, 97]. We revisit
this important distinction in Section 8.1.
Dwork et al. say “the metric should (ideally) capture ground truth” [43]. This inspired Friedler et al. to define
the construct space, the variables on which we want to base decisions [51]. For example, suppose we want to base
decisions on (the probability of) the outcome for a specific individual i. Let I be a random individual drawn from
the population.10 We can express the construct space as CS = {ti} where ti = P [Y = 1|I = i]. We cannot estimate
P [Y = 1|I = i] because we only have one individual i and we do not observe their outcome in time to make the
decision. Instead, we calculate scores si = ψ(vi) intended to estimate P [Y = 1|V = vi]. In contrast to the construct
space, the observed space is OS = {vi}. Dwork et al.’s metric can be defined using the construct space [43], but in
other work, the metric is constrained to use only the input variables [149, 97].
Friedler et al. introduce an assumption they call WYSIWYG (what you see is what you get), i.e. that we can
define a metric in the observed space that approximates a metric in the construct space: m(vi, vi′) ≈ mCS(ti, ti′).
To satisfy WYSIWYG, m may need to be aware of the sensitive variables [43]. One reason is that the insensitive
variables X may predict Y differently for different groups. For example, suppose we want to predict who likes math
so we can recruit them to the school’s math team. Let Y = 1 be liking math and X be choice of major. Suppose in
one group, students who like math are steered towards economics, and in the other group towards engineering. To
predict liking math, we should use group membership in addition to X.
10We defined V, Y as random draws from the population and considered probabilities and expectations with respect to their distri-
bution p(v, y). This is the margin of the full distribution p(v, y, i), where i indexes individuals.
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Friedler et al. also introduce an alternate assumption called WAE (we’re all equal), i.e. that the groups have
small distance in the construct space [51]. On this basis, we could adjust a metric in the observed space so that the
groups have small distance [43]. Relatedly, Johndrow and Lum describe adjusting the insensitive variables X so that
they are independent of group [87].
4.3.2 Relaxations
Rothblum and Yona relax the metric fairness condition [149]:
• (α1, α2, γ) Approximate metric fairness:
P
[
P
[|δ(V )− δ(V ′)| > m(V, V ′) + γ|V ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
% of people treated γ−differently from someone with variables V
> α2
]
≤ α1.
Informally, they say a person is α2-discriminated against if the fraction of people treated γ-differently from them
exceeds α2. Any group of size at least α1 cannot all experience α2-discrimination. Taking γ = 0, α2 = 0, α1 = 0
gives Dwork’s condition.
4.4 Causal definitions
We have already introduced causal notions, considering the potential or counterfactual11 values under different deci-
sions [151, 82, 73]. Causal fairness definitions consider instead counterfactuals under different settings of a sensitive
variable. Let vi(a) = (a, xi(a)) be the input variables if the individual had their sensitive variable set to a. We write
di(a) = δ(vi(a)) = δ(a, xi(a)) for the corresponding decision, e.g. what would the hiring decision be if they had been
white? We define random variables V (a), D(a) as values randomly drawn from the population.
There is debate over whether these counterfactuals are well-defined. Pearl allows counterfactuals under conditions
without specifying how those conditions are established, e.g. “if they had been white”. In contrast, Herna´n and Robins
introduce counterfactuals only under well-defined interventions, e.g. the intervention studied by Greiner and Rubin:
“if the name on their resume were set to be atypical among black people” [68, 73].
Putting these issues to the side, we can proceed to define fairness in terms of counterfactual decisions under
different settings of a sensitive variable. We order definitions from strongest to weakest:12
• Individual Counterfactual Fairness: di(a) = di(a′) for all i
• Conditional Counterfactual Parity: E[D(a) | Data] = E[D(a′) | Data]
• Counterfactual Parity: E[D(a)] = E[D(a′)]
Kusner et al.’s “counterfactual fairness” is a form of conditional counterfactual parity [104]. Conditioned on a lot of
data, this approaches individual counterfactual fairness. If D(a) ⊥ A | Data ∀a (a criterion called ignorability or
unconfoundedness [138, 61, 82, 73]), then conditional counterfactual parity is equivalent to conditional demographic
parity.
These first three causal definitions consider the total effect of A (e.g. race) on D (e.g. hiring). However, it is
possible to consider some causal pathways from the sensitive variable to be fair. For example, suppose race affects
education obtained. If hiring decisions are based on the applicant’s education, then race affects hiring decisions.
Perhaps one considers this path from race to hiring through education to be fair. It often helps to visualize causal
relationships graphically, see Figure 1.13
In this cartoon version of the world, a complex historical process creates an individual’s race and socioeconomic
status at birth [169, 85]. These both affect the hiring decision, including through education. Let xi = (ci,mi) where
mi are variables possibly affected by race, so xi(a) = (ci,mi(a)). We can define effects along paths by defining fancier
counterfactuals. Let di(a
′,mi(a)) be the decision if applicant i had their race set to a′, while their education were
set to whatever value it would have attained if they had their race set to a [125]. To disallow the red path in Figure
1, we can define
• No Direct Effect Fairness: di(a) = di(a′,mi(a)) for all i
11We use the terms “potential outcomes” and “counterfactuals” interchangeably [73].
12Conditional counterfactual parity implies counterfactual parity (by averaging over the distribution of Data in the population).
However, conditional demographic parity (D ⊥ A|Data) does not in general imply demographic parity (D ⊥ A), because the distribution
of Data may differ by group (this idea underlies Simpson’s “paradox” [14]). Results 4 and 5 give results about the relationship between
conditional and unconditional independence.
13See Pearl [138] section 1.3.1 for a definition of causal graphs, which encode conditional independence statements for counterfactuals.
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History
A: Race C: SES
M: Education
D: Hiring
Figure 1: A causal graph showing direct (red), indirect (blue), and back-door (green) paths from race to hiring.
We can rewrite this as δ(a, ci,mi(a)) = δ(a
′, ci,mi(a)) and compare to unawareness, i.e. δ(a, ci,mi) = δ(a′, ci,mi).14
Given access to δ and ci,mi in some population, we can check unawareness. However, mi(a) is only observed when
ai = a, so we cannot check no direct effect fairness. Instead, assuming ignorability M(a) ⊥ A | C, we can check:
• No Average Direct Effect Fairness: E[D(a)] = E[D(a′,M(a))]
Beyond direct effects, one could consider other directed paths from race to be fair or unfair. Two definitions from
the literature include:
• No Unfair Path-Specific Effects [125]: no average effects along unfair (user-specified) directed paths from A to D
• No Unresolved Discrimination [96]: there is no directed path from A to D unless through a resolving variable (a
variable that is influenced by A in a manner that we accept as nondiscriminatory)
All of the above causal definitions consider only directed paths from race. In Figure 1, these include the red and
blue paths. But what about the green paths? Known as back-door paths [138], these do not represent causal effects
of race, and therefore are permitted under causal definitions of fairness. However, back-door paths can contribute
to the association between race and hiring. Indeed, they are why we say “correlation is not causation.”15 Zhang
and Bareinboim decompose the total disparity into disparities from each type of path (direct, indirect, back-door)
[180] (in a follow-up paper, they decompose disparity in error rates into causal quantities [179]). In contrast to the
causal fairness definitions, health disparities are defined to include contribution from back-door paths (e.g. through
socioeconomics at birth) [133, 42, 27, 7, 85].
Causal definitions of fairness focus our attention on how to compensate for causal influences at decision time.
Causal reasoning can be used instead to design interventions (to reduce disparities and improve overall outcomes),
rather than to define fairness. In particular, causal graphs can be used to develop interventions at earlier points,
prior to decision-making [85, 8].
5 Alternative setups: reinforcement learning and bandits
We now describe alternative setups in which fairness has been studied. Readers can skip this section without loss of
continuity.
Reinforcement learning (RL) develops a decision-making policy in a setup that generalizes that of Sections 2 and 3
in two main ways. First, our earlier setup assumed an already-collected batch sample used to build a decision function
that is then applied to a simultaneous set of decisions in the population. In contrast, RL considers a sequence of
decisions, where the results of previous decisions inform subsequent ones. In evaluating the utility and fairness of
these decisions we therefore evaluate the entire sequence of decisions (unlike before, when we regarded the sample as
“free” and only evaluated performance in the population).
A second generalization in the RL setup is that for any given decision we observe a reward corresponding to the
decision’s immediate utility, but we do not, in general, know whether this reward was the best available one. This is a
14Unawareness is described by [34] as zero “causal mean difference” and by [57] as zero “causal discrimination score”.
15If C satisfies the back-door criterion (C includes no descendants of A and blocks all back-door paths between A and D) in a causal
graph, then unconfoundedness (D(a) ⊥ A|C ∀a) holds [138, 140]. The converse is not true in general.
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departure from the previous setup, where our assumptions allowed us to determine the utility-maximizing decisions,
given the vector of outcomes y from our sample. Therefore, our previous setup reduced the problem of learning the
optimal policy to predicting the utility-maximizing decisions (assumed to be observed in the sample). However, in
RL we do not assume we have data on the optimal decisions to mimic. This second distinction is often cited as the
fundamental difference between supervised learning and reinforcement learning [162].
Some new terminology and notation is useful for RL. The expected reward for a decision depends on the state.
Define random variables for each time t: Θt is the state, Dt the decision, and Rt+1 the immediate reward. Let
Ht = (Θ0, D0, R1, ...,Θt−1, Dt−1, Rt) be the history until time t.
In full generality, the evolution of a system can exhibit arbitrary dependence on the history of states, decisions,
and rewards. However, it is common to assume that the system is a Markov decision process whose states and rewards
exhibit the Markov property: given the current state and decision, the next reward and state are independent of the
history, Rt+1,Θt+1 ⊥ Ht | Θt, Dt.
Even simpler is the setup called bandits, which assumes the current decision is independent of future states (similar
to our “simultaneous” assumption in Section 3).16 Joseph et al. [89] introduced fairness notions in the bandits setup.
They only consider immediate rewards because current decisions are independent of future states (bandits setup) and
therefore independent of future rewards (Markov property).
Let pit(d|θ) = P [Dt = d|Θt = θ,Ht] be the probability of decision d at state θ and time t (sometimes called a
policy, which generalizes δ from our setup). Note that pit(d|θ) is a function of the random history Ht.
5.1 Weakly meritocratic fairness
• Weakly meritocratic fairness (immediate reward): There exists  > 0 such that,
P
[
∀t, θ, d, d′ pit(d|θ) > pit(d′|θ)⇒ E[Rt+1|Θt = θ,Dt = d] > E[Rt+1|Θt = θ,Dt = d′]
]
≥ 1− 
In other words, we have a probabilistic guarantee whenever one decision is favored over another that it is superior
in terms of expected immediate reward.
Joseph et al. apply this definition to contextual bandits (using a hiring example) [89, 88]: Θt are the variables
(contexts) for all applicants at time t, Dt is the hiring decision. Joseph et al. [89] assume one person is hired at
each time and the reward depends only on the context for that hired person:
E[Rt+1|Θt = {vi}, Dt = hire i] = E[Rt+1|hire someone with vi].
They call this expected reward the applicant’s “quality”.
P
[
∀t, θ, i, i′ pit(hire i|θ) > pit(hire i′|θ)⇒ E[Rt+1|hire someone with vi]︸ ︷︷ ︸
“quality” of person i
> E[Rt+1|hire someone with vi′ ]
]
≥ 1− 
Their follow-up paper [88] allows multiple people to be hired at each time. They define fairness only in terms of
marginal hiring probabilities and applicant “quality”, not the full decision and reward.
In the full RL setup, the current decision can affect future states and rewards. Jabbari et al. [83] define a decision’s
“quality” as its long-term expected rewards (discounted by λ ∈ [0, 1]). Their notion of fairness is:
• Weakly meritocratic fairness (full RL) [83]: There exists  > 0 such that,
P
[
∀t, θ, d, d′ pit(d|θ) > pit(d′|θ)⇒ Epi∗
[ ∞∑
k=0
λkRt+k+1
∣∣Θt = θ,Dt = d] > Epi∗ [ ∞∑
k=0
λkRt+k+1
∣∣Θt = θ,Dt = d′]] ≥ 1−
where the expectations are taken over Dt+1, Dt+2, ... following the optimal policy pi
∗.
The notion of “quality” in the contextual bandit setup [89, 88] is analogous to “true risk” in the rest of our
paper. Both change with variable selection and assume enough predictive variables (context) to justify using the
word “meritocratic”. These definitions are called “weakly” meritocratic because though we cannot favor a “worse”
option, we are not required to favor a better option [88]. Weakly meritocratic fairness with deterministic decision
rules is analogous to single-threshold fairness.
16Formally, we assume the Markov property, so we can describe dynamics by P [Rt+1,Θt+1| Θt, Dt] which we can write as
P [Rt+1| Θt, Dt] ∗ P [Θt+1| Rt+1,Θt, Dt]. Then the bandits assumption is that these terms can be dropped.
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5.2 Metric/Smooth fairness
Liu et al. [112] consider a bandits setup where at each round, one person arrives from each group at random, and
one person is hired per round (based only on their group). Let p(r|a) be the distribution of rewards in group a.
Analogous to metric fairness [43], they define:
• Metric/Smooth fairness [112]: There exist 1, 2 ≥ 0, 3 ∈ [0, 1], and some divergence function such that
P
[∀t, a, a′ divergence(pit(hire person from a)||pit(hire person from a′)) ≤ 1divergence(p(r|a)||p(r|a′))+ 2] ≥ 1−3
5.3 Calibration
Liu et al. [112] also define calibration in their bandits setup:
• Calibration in bandits [112]: P [Ra′ = maxaRa] = pit(hire person from a′) where Ra ∼ p(r|a) is the reward for
someone randomly drawn from group a.
We can relate this notion to calibration within groups from Section 4.1.2: P [Y = 1|S,A = a′] = S, i.e. among
people mapped to the same S, the probability that Y = 1 is S. Here calibration in bandits means that among people
mapped to the same hiring probability pit (i.e., with the same a), the probability that they are the best (among a
random draw of one from each group) is pit.
6 Intersectionality
Much of the ML fairness literature considers the simple case of two groups (advantaged and disadvantaged). However,
the fairness flavors described in the previous sections could each be applied to various groups. For clarity, we advocate
separating two axes: the flavors of fairness (Section 4 and 5) from the groups to which they can be applied (this
section). The latter can be informed by the notion of intersectionality [32], which highlights that discrimination
might affect members at the intersection of two groups, even if neither group experiences discrimination in isolation.
In her influential work, Crenshaw analyzed failed employment discrimination lawsuits involving black women who
could only seek recourse against discrimination as black women which they were unable to establish simply as sex
discrimination (since it does not apply to white women) or as race discrimination (since it does not apply to black
men) [32].
The quantitative literatures have been motivated by related concerns, e.g. in epidemiology [86, 84]. In the ML
fairness literature, Buolamwini and Gebru evaluated commercial gender classification systems and found that darker-
skinned females are the most misclassified group [19]. Kearns et al. apply approximate statistical and false positive
rate parity to groups of large enough size that are defined by the sensitive variables [95]. Foulds et al. apply Bayesian
methods to overcome data sparsity in checking statistical parities for small groups [50]. He´bert-Johnson et al. apply
approximate calibration to groups defined by any of the input variables [72]. Kim et al. apply metric fairness to
groups defined by the input variables, informally guaranteeing that similar subgroups are treated similarly, while not
assuming the metric is entirely known [97]. Rothblum and Yona apply approximate metric fairness to any group
of large enough size [149]. At the extreme, one can take groups to be individuals. Some definitions already give
parity across individuals: single-threshold fairness (and the analogous weakly meritocratic fairness in the bandits/RL
setups), unawareness, and metric fairness.
We could similarly extend causal definitions of fairness. Instead of comparing across several groups of people, one
could compare across several counterfactuals. In Section 4.4, we compared counterfactual outcomes under settings
of one sensitive variable (e.g., “what if the applicant were white instead of black?”). One could compare more
fine-grained counterfactual contrasts (e.g., “what if the applicant were a black woman instead of a white male?”) [15].
As we discuss below in Section 8.1, terming these approaches as “intersectional” or “fairness” tends to equate
statistical parities with more complex concepts. Checking a statistical parity may be well-motivated, and partly
motivated by the literature on intersectionality. However, labeling a decision “intersectionally fair” can overpromise
and undermine efforts to challenge the systems that generated social hierarchies [75].
7 Impossibilities
In this section we catalogue several results showing that it is typically impossible to simultaneously satisfy all flavors
of fairness from section 4. Practitioners will therefore need to choose among them. To that end, we also discuss some
of their mathematical and moral tensions.
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7.1 Separation and sufficiency
Tension between margins of the confusion matrix is expressed in three very similar results.17
Result 1 (Proposition 4 in Barocas et al. [10], Theorem 17.2 in Wasserman [173]). Assume separation (S ⊥ A|Y )
and sufficiency (Y ⊥ A|S). Then at least one of the following is true:
• (Y, S) ⊥ A
• An event in the joint distribution has probability zero.18
Result 2 (Kleinberg et al. [100]). Assume binary Y and S = E[Y |V ]. Assume also balance for the negative class,
balance for the positive class, and calibration within groups. Then at least one of the following is true:
• Equal base rates: Y ⊥ A
• Perfect prediction: P [Y = 1|V = v] = 0 or 1 for all v ∈ V
Equal base rates and perfect prediction can be called trivial, degenerate, or even utopian (representing two very
different utopias).
Result 3 (Chouldechova [21]). Assume binary Y and D. Assume also that equal FPRs, equal FNRs, and equal
PPVs hold. Then at least one of the following is true:19
• Equal base rates: Y ⊥ A
• FPR = 0, PPV = 1 for both groups
• FPR = 0, FNR = 1 for both groups
7.1.1 The COMPAS debate
Tension between margins of the confusion matrix factored into a debate about a tool called COMPAS (Correctional
Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions) and its estimates of risk for “recidivism” (one can object
to the term as creating an impression of certainty that there was a first offense). ProPublica published a highly
influential analysis based on data obtained through public records requests [6, 106]. They found that COMPAS
does not satisfy equal FNRs: among defendants who got rearrested, white defendants were twice as likely to be
misclassified as low risk. COMPAS also does not satisfy equal FPRs: among defendants who did not get rearrested,
black defendants were twice as likely to be misclassified as high risk.
Northpointe (now Equivant), the developers of COMPAS, critiqued ProPublica’s work and pointed out that
COMPAS satisfies equal PPVs: among those labeled higher risk, the proportion of defendants who got rearrested is
approximately the same regardless of race [39]. COMPAS also satisfies calibration within groups [48]. ProPublica
then responded to these critiques [4, 5, 3]. Much of the subsequent conversation consisted of either trying to harmonize
these definitions of fairness or asserting that one or the other is correct.
The debate between definitions was particularly intense because the decision space (detain or not) is so narrow
and harmful. Different definitions dictate how the harm of detention is allocated across groups. Instead of choosing
among these, we can choose alternative, less harmful policies (see Section 3.3).
7.2 Separation and demographic parity
The next two results have not (yet) been as central to public debate as the previous results, but we include them in
our catalogue for completeness.
Result 4 (Barocas et al. Proposition 3 in [10]). Assume Y is binary. Assume also that separation (S ⊥ A|Y ) and
demographic parity (S ⊥ A) hold. Then at least one of the following is true:
• Equal base rates: Y ⊥ A
• Y ⊥ S
17We write results 1, 4, and 5 in terms of scores, outcomes, and sensitive variables, but they are more general properties about
random variables.
18Formally, there exist Borel sets Ba, Bs, By such that
P [A ∈ Ba], P [S ∈ Bs], P [Y ∈ By ] > 0 but
P [A ∈ Ba, S ∈ Bs, Y ∈ By ] = 0.
19This result comes from the following relationship among FPR, FNR, PPV, and base rate:
FPR =
P [Y = 1]
1− P [Y = 1]
1− PPV
PPV
(1− FNR)
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7.3 Sufficiency and demographic parity
Result 5 (Barocas et al. Proposition 2 in [10]). Assume sufficiency (Y ⊥ A|S) and demographic parity (S ⊥ A).
Then we must have equal base rates: Y ⊥ A.
7.4 Unawareness and demographic parity
Corbett-Davies et al. and Lipton et al. both note that a decision rule δ that maximizes Gsss(δ; c) under a demographic
parity constraint (in general) uses the sensitive variables a both in estimating the conditional probabilities and for
determining their thresholds [30, 108]. Therefore, solutions such as disparate learning processes (DLPs), which allow
the use of sensitive variables during model building but not prediction, are either sub- or equi-optimal [139, 91, 92,
93, 177].
Lipton et al. present this result as a tension between unawareness and demographic parity [108]. It is, but the result
is conditional on a choice of outcome y, insensitive variables x, and optimization goal. Changing any of these could
result in reduced demographic disparity under unawareness. For example, in lending, we could consider repayment
under different loan conditions (e.g. a longer time-line) y′. We can also change the shape of the distributions of
conditional probabilities by considering new variables x′. In pretrial detention, we could consider a G′ that penalizes
false positives more strongly, bringing the threshold up to where the distributions of the conditional probabilities
might look much more similar, lessening disparity in detention rates.
Unlike the other impossibility results, unawareness and demographic parity do not imply equal base rates, perfect
prediction, or some other “degenerate” case.
8 Discussion
Here we discuss two recommendations. First, we highlight confusing terminology and suggest moving to more
descriptive language. Next, we briefly point to processes and research that respond to the scientific and political
concerns that we have raised about prediction-based decision-making.
8.1 Terminology
In the computer science literature it is common to conflate an individual with their variables [95]. Definitions are
also inconsistent: Dwork et al. consider a similarity metric over individuals [43], but the metric is often defined over
the variables input to the classifier [149, 97]. In Section 4.3, we distinguished between P [Y = 1|I = i] (probability
of the outcome conditional on a specific individual i) and P [Y = 1|V = vi] (probability of the outcome conditional
on variables vi). The latter is sometimes called an individual’s “true risk” [30, 29], but it is not conditional on the
individual, only some measured variables. We propose avoiding this terminology, and describing P [Y = 1|V = vi] as
probabilities conditional on variables vi (also called the Bayes predictor or Bayes optimal predictor).
The term “biased data” (e.g. [91, 11, 21, 108]) collapses retrospective injustice (societal bias) with concerns about
non-representative sampling and measurement error (statistical bias), see Figure 2. There is overlap between the
two concepts, e.g. using arrests as a measure of crime can introduce statistical bias from measurement error that is
differential by race because of a racist policing system [1, 114]. But suppose we could perfectly measure crime, does
this make the data free from “bias”? In a statistical sense, yes.20 In a societal sense, no, because crime rates reflect
societal injustice (including how crime is defined [147]).
The term “biased model/algorithm” is used to describe violations of parities, e.g. unequal FPRs [6]. Lipton
and Steinhardt caution against collapsing statistical parities with legal or ethical concepts [109]. Adopting the word
“fairness” or “intersectional” to describe the above definitions leads to confusion, e.g. thinking that we should
“applaud and encourage” the application of any of them because it “ immediately increases the amount of fairness,
by some metric” [164]. This “mythic equivalence between technical and social notions of fairness” precludes progress
by stifling necessary debate about how to weigh competing normative commitments [67]. Similarly, a quantity labeled
“utility” or “social welfare” may fail to reflect the goals of many.
8.2 Ways forward
In Section 3, we described concerning choices and assumptions often used to justify a prediction-based decision system.
As we have seen, one way to address these is by examining relevant flavors of “fairness” definitions from Section 4.
20In statistics, “bias” refers to properties of an estimator, not data. Here we mean bias in the estimation of conditional probabilities
or fairness metrics that could result from non-representative data, measurement error, or model misspecification.
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world as it should and could be
world as it is
     retrospective injustice
    (societal bias)
world according to data
    non-representative sampling
    measurement error
    (statistical bias)
Figure 2: A cartoon showing two components of “biased data”: societal bias and statistical bias.
This paper does not discuss what to do with a flavor of fairness. Briefly, one could: 1) constrain the decision function
to satisfy a fairness flavor (a focus of the ML fairness literature), 2) change the data collection to reduce unfairness
[20] (addressing parts of Section 3), or 3) design interventions to reduce disparities in input variables and outcomes
[85] (which would reduce disparities in decisions in the long term).
Another way forward is to address Section 3 directly. Here we sketch that approach, including pointing to some
of the relevant statistics literature.
Starting with clearly articulated goals can improve accountability. To best serve those goals, consider whether
interventions should be made at the individual or aggregate level. Carefully describe the eligible population to
clarify who is impacted by the possible interventions. Expanding the decision space to include less harmful and more
supportive interventions can benefit all groups and mitigate fairness concerns.
To build a decision system aligned with stated goals, choose outcomes carefully, considering data limitations. Using
prior information [61] can help specify a realistic utility function. For example, instead of assuming benefits and
harms are constant across decisions (the “symmetric” assumption), prior data can inform a more realistic distribution.
Instead of assuming one potential outcome is known, causal methods can be used to estimate effects of decisions.
Furthermore, these effects may not be separate and constant across the population. As such, causal methods can be
used to study interference [134, 118] and heterogeneous effects [60].
Documenting data collection (sampling, measurement) [59, 76] enables modeling that accounts for data collection
(Chapter 8 of [61], [150, 110, 62]). Combining all choices in one expanded model [175] can mitigate sensitivity of
decisions to model selection. Documenting model performance [159, 160, 174, 122], both overall and within subgroups,
evaluates the model and checks some of the “fairness” definitions from Section 4.
9 Conclusion
We have identified several pitfalls in the justification of prediction-based decision systems and offered a catalogue
of notions of fairness. Neither maximization of a “utility function” (e.g. accuracy) nor satisfaction of a “fairness
constraint” (e.g. demographic parity) guarantee social and political goals. Neither provide a complete, causal model
of the world to prescribe interventions towards those goals. Both can narrow focus to the quantifiable, introduce
harmful simplifications, and mislead that the issues are purely technical [67, 131]. But while data and mathematical
formalization are far from saviors, they are not doomed to be tools of oppression. Indeed, purposeful alternatives are
possible [54, 144].
In the pursuit of that goal, we need explicit, clear communication. We attempted this in cataloguing the choices
and assumptions made, often implicitly, to justify a prediction-based decision system. We presented several definitions
of fairness from the literature in common notation to facilitate comparisons, regarding none as the axiomatic definition
of fairness, justice, or nondiscrimination.
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